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Abstract
Two fundamentally different perspectives on knowledge diffusion dominate debates about
academic disciplines. On the one hand, critics of disciplinary research and education have
argued that disciplines are isolated silos, within which specialists pursue inward-looking
and increasingly narrow research agendas. On the other hand, critics of the silo argument
have demonstrated that researchers constantly import and export ideas across disciplinary
boundaries. These perspectives have different implications for how knowledge diffuses,
how intellectuals gain and lose status within their disciplines, and how intellectual repu-
tations evolve within and across disciplines. We argue that highly general claims about the
nature of disciplinary boundaries are counterproductive, and that research on the nature of
specific disciplinary boundaries is more useful. To that end, this paper uses a novel pub-
lication and citation network dataset and statistical models of citation networks to test
hypotheses about the boundaries between philosophy of science and 11 disciplinary
clusters. Specifically, we test hypotheses about whether engaging with and being cited by
scientific communities outside philosophy of science has an impact on one’s position
within philosophy of science. Our results suggest that philosophers of science produce
interdisciplinary scholarship, but they tend not to cite work by other philosophers when it is
published in journals outside of their discipline. Furthermore, net of other factors, receiving
citations from other disciplines has no meaningful impact—positive or negative—on
citations within philosophy of science. We conclude by considering this evidence for
simultaneous interdisciplinarity and insularity in terms of scientific trading theory and
other work on disciplinary boundaries and communication.
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Introduction
Two fundamentally different perspectives on knowledge diffusion dominate debates about
academic disciplines. On the one hand, critics of disciplinary research and education have
argued that disciplines are isolated silos, within which specialists pursue inward-looking
and increasingly narrow research agendas (e.g., Frodeman 2010). These silos are repro-
duced in part by the incommensurability of disciplinary paradigms and epistemic cultures,
‘‘disciplinary ethnocentrism’’ (Campbell 1969), asymmetrical borrowing (Klein 1990), and
‘‘willful ignorance,’’ as researchers simultaneously make their own disciplinary knowledge
more esoteric and push back against knowledge from other disciplines (see Jacobs 2014).
Many interdisciplinary fields in the social sciences and humanities emerged in the context
of these and related critiques of the disciplinary system (Ilhan 2013; Rojas 2007; Small
1999; Turk-Bicakci 2007).
On the other hand, critics of the silo argument have demonstrated that researchers
constantly import and export ideas across disciplinary boundaries (Jacobs 2014; Jacobs and
Frickel 2009). An enormous volume of bibliometric evidence supports this position, from
maps of science highlighting connections within and across disciplines (Boyack, Klavans,
and Bo¨rner 2005; Bo¨rner, Chen, and Boyack 2003; Bo¨rner et al. 2012; Chen and Hicks
2004; Leydesdorff and Rafols 2009; Moody and Light 2006; Skupin, Biberstine, and
Bo¨rner 2013) to quantitative research on diffusion, collaboration, and the exponential
growth of science (Coccia and Bozeman 2016; Coccia and Wang 2016; Crane 1972; Liu
et al. 2015; Price 1963; Yu et al. 2010; Zhu and Yan 2015). Theories, measures, and
models of disciplinary knowledge diffusion (Bettencourt et al. 2008; Gao and Guan 2011;
Herrera, Roberts, and Gulbahce 2010; Vitanov and Ausloos 2012; Yan 2014; Yan et al.
2013) and interdisciplinarity (Chen et al. 2014, 2015; Cronin and Sugimoto 2014; Larivie`re
et al. 2014; Light and Adams 2016) are increasingly common. At the same time, qualitative
research has advanced our understanding of how communication and collaboration across
disciplinary boundaries is facilitated by trading zones and evolving professional languages
(e.g., Collins 2011; Collins et al. 2010; Galison 1997; Gorman 2002, 2010).
A considerable amount of research on discipline-level knowledge diffusion has been
guided by an economic metaphor: trade (Cronin and Meho 2008; Cronin and Pearson 1990;
Larivie`re et al. 2012; Lockett and McWilliams 2005; Stigler 1994; Yan et al. 2013). Yan
et al. (2013) systematically develop the metaphor, arguing that research on disciplinary
knowledge imports and exports enables researchers to assess how ‘‘self-dependent’’ a
discipline is, and what its ‘‘scientific trading impact’’ is within the global scientific system.
This work focuses primarily on the macro-level trade states of disciplinary and interdis-
ciplinary fields themselves, not on the concrete flows of knowledge across disciplines or on
the actual boundaries between fields. This has led Yan (2014) to develop path-based
approaches for identifying influential knowledge flows. Specifically, he uses maximum
spanning tree algorithms to identify critical knowledge channels in weighted citation
networks. This work moves beyond examining disciplinary import/export ratios by taking
the network structure—or ‘‘backbone’’ (Boyack et al. 2005)—of science into account, and
by emphasizing the positions that disciplines occupy along critical knowledge diffusion
paths. In short, it reveals the relationships between disciplines by identifying the most
important and well-traveled knowledge paths.
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All of this research is predominantly focused on the natural, life, and social sciences.
The humanities are rarely included.1 As a result, we know much less about disciplinary
boundaries and knowledge diffusion within the humanities, or between humanities and
science disciplines. When it comes to disciplinary divides, we would naturally expect to
see the most extreme disconnection between humanities and sciences disciplines. In his
classic lecture from 1959, CP Snow suggested that the literary intellectuals representing the
humanities not only had a different culture and language than those representing the
physical sciences, but also that the two were deeply suspicious of one another and regarded
one another as naive or misguided—albeit for different reasons (Snow 1959). Therefore, if
disciplines are balkanized as a result of incommensurable paradigms or ‘‘willful igno-
rance,’’ we would expect those who cross disciplinary boundaries between the humanities
and the sciences to be the most affected.
In this paper, we focus on the boundaries between philosophy of science and the
sciences that philosophers study. Our work starts from the assumption that either/or
arguments about knowledge diffusion and disciplinarity (i.e., silo vs. web arguments) are
counterproductive. Disciplinary researchers do import and export ideas, but they do not
trade with all disciplines equally. The important question, then, is not whether disciplines
are silos or connected in evolving social and intellectual webs in general. Rather, the
important questions are in the formation, strength, and dissolution of the connections
between specific disciplines and interdisciplines (see Van Leeuwen and Robert 2000), and
in the relationship between intellectual reputations, status, and the shifting landscape of
disciplinary boundaries. To that end, our specific goal in this paper is to better understand
how engagement with and recognition from scientific fields impacts one’s citations within
philosophy of science. We use a statistical network model designed to estimate the
probability of a philosophy of science paper receiving a citation from other philosophers of
science, with citation counts in a wide-range of scientific disciplines as covariates.2 This
enables us to test hypotheses (discussed below) about the nature of the boundaries between
philosophy of science and the sciences it studies, on citation dynamics within philosophy
of science.
There has been very little quantitative research on philosophy of science to date. This is
especially true for bibliometric research. The only articles about philosophy of science in
the core bibliometric, scientometric, and informetric journals are attempts to identify high
impact historical publications (Wray and Bornmann 2015), or the relationships with
cognate fields like epistemology (Kreuzman 2001). No studies have yet attempted to
analyze the relationship between philosophy of science and the sciences, despite the
potential to advance research on knowledge diffusion and disciplinary boundaries.
Qualitative research on philosophy emphasizes the cultural differences between phi-
losophy and other disciplines. For example, Lamont’s (2009) extensive study of decision
making on grant adjudication committees in the social sciences and humanities identifies a
variety of ways that philosophers and non-philosophers understand the discipline as being
fundamentally different, and a ‘‘problem case’’ (pages 64–69). Other social scientific
research on philosophy has mostly focused on the social structure of creativity and
1 One legitimate reason for excluding the humanities is that available bibliometric data has less coverage.
Books are more important in the humanities than in the social sciences, and books are not well indexed.
2 More specifically, we use Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGMs), which are relatively new
development in network analysis (Lusher et al. 2012; Robins et al. 2007). ERGMs are rare in the sociology
of science and information science, but researchers are starting to use them in bibliometric (Fanelli and
Gla¨nzel 2013) and knowledge management research (Jiang et al. 2015; Lungeanu et al. 2014; Su and
Contractor 2011; Sˇkerlavaj et al. 2010).
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interacting schools of thought (e.g., Collins’ 2009), or on intellectual self-concepts (Gross
2002, 2009).
We recently conducted an international survey of philosophers of science (which will be
reported in other articles) that suggests that the majority of philosophers of science want
their work to have an influence on science, but that being embedded in traditional phi-
losophy departments makes it difficult to meaningfully engage with scientists. For
example, one obvious way philosophers can influence science is to publish in scientific
journals, yet our survey and interview data suggest that many philosophy departments tend
not to recognize or reward publications outside philosophy journals. We examined this
problem in greater depth in semi-structured interviews with philosophers of science from
Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Australia.
This perceived tendency not to recognize work that falls outside of the discipline poses
unique challenges for philosophers of science in general, but especially for those who think
that philosophy is better and more useful when it is engaged with, even embedded in,
scientific communities (e.g., Fehr and Plaisance 2010). Proponents of this position are
concerned that their engagement with science could ultimately hurt their academic careers,
or those of their students (Fehr and Plaisance 2010). As such, advice from senior scholars
varies from ‘‘don’t do it’’ (or at least, wait until tenure) to ‘‘have dual careers,’’ one
philosophical, one scientific.
In the sections below, we describe four competing hypotheses about the boundaries
between philosophy of science and the sciences. Then, we explain how we collected the
raw data, constructed the network dataset, and developed the statistical models. We then
present the findings and conclude with a discussion of the implications for research on
disciplines, and for philosophers of science who wish to have an impact on the sciences
they study.
Hypotheses
If the paradigms and epistemic cultures between philosophy of science and the sciences are
radically mismatched, or if philosophers are insular and actively resist importing and
exporting ideas—as hard critics of the disciplinary ‘‘silos’’ or critics of the siloed nature of
philosophy itself suggest—, then we should expect increases in citations from the sciences
to have a negative impact on citations within philosophy itself. The basic idea is that the
more a philosopher is engaged with and appealing to scientists, the less appealing or
relevant she is to philosophers. Her colleagues are less likely to see her as a ‘‘real’’
philosopher. Even further, it may be the case that, because of mismatched cultures,
philosophers of science are actually penalized for engaging the sciences, especially con-
troversial sciences such as behavioral genetics (see Panofsky 2014), where philosophers
often demand ‘‘critical distance.’’ In short, we would expect philosophers with higher
citations in the sciences to have lower citations in philosophy of science.
Alternatively, if philosophers collectively value sharing their expertise with scientists,
then we would not expect to see them penalized for successfully engaging scientific
communities. Instead, we would expect citations from scientific fields to contribute to an
increase the probability of receiving citations from philosophers as well. This could be due
to cumulative advantage, for example, where citations beget more citations in a fashion
familiar to any sociologist or information scientist since Merton’s (1973) pioneering
research. In short, success in one field begets success in others. If it is the case, we would
expect to see philosophers that publish in scientific journals and get cited by scientists to
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have a higher probability of being cited by other philosophers. Among other things, this
outcome could be due to a tendency for philosophically-minded scientists to cite
philosophers that are well-respected within the philosophy of science community, or to a
tendency for respected philosophers of science to invest in their intellectual reputations and
visibility in the sciences by publishing in science journals.
Another possibility is that philosophers of science may differentiate between scientific
disciplines, with some being considered worthy of serious engagement and others more
deserving of ‘‘critical distance.’’ Perhaps citations from disciplines that are broadly friendly
to philosophical work—say some branches of cognitive science—may actually increase the
likelihood of citations from within philosophy, whereas citations from more controversial
fields—again, such as behavioral genetics—may decrease the likelihood of citations. In
short, the likelihood of receiving a citation boost or a citation penalty varies by scientific
field.
Finally, it is possible that most philosophers of science simply do not read extensively
outside of their own discipline, and that writing in or being cited in scientific journals does
not affect one’s position with philosophy of science. If this is the case, we would expect to
find that publishing in scientific journals has no significant positive or negative impact on a
philosopher’s chances of being cited by other philosophers.
To summarize, we assess the boundaries between philosophy of science and the sci-
ences by testing four hypotheses:
1. Net of other factors, publishing in and being cited in science journals reduces the
likelihood of being cited by other philosophers of science. We will refer to this as the
citation penalty hypothesis.
2. Net of other factors, publishing in and being cited in science journals increases the
likelihood of being cited by other philosophers. We will refer to this as the cumulative
advantage hypothesis.
3. Net of other factors, the positive or negative effects of publishing or being cited in any
in science journals varies based on the type of science from which a philosopher
receives uptake. We will refer to this as the field-specific hypothesis.
4. Net of other factors, publishing in and being cited in science journals does not change
the likelihood of being cited by other philosophers. We will refer to this as the
separate worlds hypothesis.
Data and methods
Testing these hypotheses requires an article-level citation network specific to work pro-
duced by philosophers of science, and many covariates capturing, among other things,
discipline-specific citation counts from work produced by non-philosophers. The resulting
network can then be modeled using exponential random graph models (ERGMs), which
are also rarely used in the bibliometric literature. The sections below clarify how we
constructed this unique network dataset, and how we specified the ERGM.
First, we created a list of philosophers of science by identifying anyone who published 2
or more articles in any of the major philosophy of science journals,3 wrote a philosophy of
science dissertation indexed by ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, or was a member of the
3 Philosophy of Science; British Journal for the Philosophy of Science; Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science, Parts A, B, and C; Synthese; European Journal for Philosophy of Science; Journal for General
Philosophy of Science; and International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. We arrived at this list by
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American, Canadian, or British professional associations in 2016.4 We collected the
metadata for all available publications by these authors (n = 27,734) from the Web of
Science database,5 regardless of whether the article was published in a philosophy of
science journal. We refer to this collection of articles published by philosophers as Record
Set 1. In addition to this data, we collected the metadata for all articles citing the articles
published by philosophers of science (n = 140,918). We refer to this collection of citing
articles as Record Set 2. We used the web of science subject classifications to group
articles into 11 categories: medicine, biology, chemistry, physics, math and computer
science, engineering and materials science, environment, psychology, social sciences,
professional fields (e.g., law), and non-philosophy humanities.6
We used the Python package metaknowledge (McLevey and McIlroy-Young 2017) to
create a citation network of the articles published by philosophers of science (24,901 nodes
and 40,537 edges). Every article in this citation network was authored or co-authored by a
philosopher of science. We then used metaknowledge to match each of the 24,901 articles
to entries in the reference lists of the 140,918 articles in Record Set 2. From the perspective
of theories of scientific trading (Yan et al. 2013; Zhu and Yan 2015), these citation counts
represent disciplinary knowledge exports (e.g., work by a philosopher getting cited in
medical journals).
Every time there is a match between a publication in Record Set 1 (articles by
philosophers) and a citation in Record Set 2 (articles citing articles by philosophers),
metaknowledge checks which of the 11 disciplinary clusters the Record Set 2 article
belongs to, and then increases the citation count for the Record 1 article in the appropriate
disciplinary cluster. For example, one of the papers in the philosophy Record Set 1 is
Wilson and Sober’s (1994) ‘‘Reintroducing group selection to the human behavioral sci-
ences.’’ metaknowledge then searches for the Wilson and Sober article in the reference lists
of non-philosophy articles in Record Set 2. The results of this process are then used to
compute 11 different citation counts for Wilson and Sober (1994); one for each of the 11
disciplinary clusters. This process is repeated for all 24,901 articles by philosophers of
science.
To summarize, we constructed our final dataset as follows: (1) identify philosophers of
science; (2) identify the articles these philosophers published to construct Record Set 1; (3)
construct an article-level philosophy of science citation network from Record Set 1; (4)
identify articles that cite the philosophy articles but are published in non-philosophy
journals to construct Record Set 2; (5) use the Web of Science subject classifications to
develop 11 disciplinary clusters and assign each article to one of the 11 clusters based on
Footnote 3 continued
checking journal rankings and corresponding with several highly-regarded senior philosophers of science
over email.
4 Unfortunately, we did not have access to the membership lists for other philosophy of science
associations.
5 We had a team of 61 research assistants disambiguate authors manually. Author disambiguation is a major
challenge in bibliometric research. While our approach is not perfect, current automated methods of author
disambiguation are much more likely to have high rates of false positive or false negatives, depending on the
approach adopted.
6 The subject classifications are widely used in bibliometric research, especially when it comes to research
on interdisciplinary citations and knowledge diffusion. However, they have been criticized for being
somewhat arbitrary. We grouped the subject classifications into broader disciplinary clusters because (1)
these more general clusters require fewer arbitrary classification decisions, and (2) having fewer categories
greatly reduces the complexity of our statistical network models.
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its subject classification; (6) match the philosophy articles (Record Set 1) to the reference
lists of non-philosophy articles (Record Set 2); (7) count the number of times each phi-
losophy of science article is cited by articles from the 11 disciplinary clusters; and finally,
(8) add the 11 new citation count variables as attributes of nodes in the philosophy citation
network. An overview of this linked record set design is shown in Fig. 1, which maps the
flow of information from Record Set 1 to Record Set 2 using our 11 aggregated subject
classifications.
The left side of Fig. 1 shows the disciplinary clusters that philosophers publish in, and
the right side shows the disciplinary clusters that those articles get cited in. The fig-
ure shows, as we would expect, that most citations to by philosophers come from journals
in the same disciplinary field. For example, articles published in psychology journals tend
to be cited by articles in other psychology journals, but they also get cited by a subset of
articles published in the social sciences, medical research, and math and computer science.
We have colored the citation flows for articles published in Philosophy of Science and
History and Philosophy of Science journals. Roughly half of the citations to articles in
these journals come from journals in different disciplines.
We developed an exponential random graph model (Lusher et al. 2012; Robins et al.
2007) to model the citation process within philosophy of science. This model estimates the
likelihood that an article written by a philosopher of science will be cited in another article
written by a philosopher of science. The linked record design outlined above enables us to
use citation counts for each of the 11 disciplinary clusters as covariates in that model,
which enables us to test the four hypotheses introduced at the start of the paper. We discuss
the model specification below.
(P) P&HPS
(P) Physics
(P) Medical
(P) Biology
(P) Chemistry
(P) Psychology
(P) Environment
(P) Social Sciences
(P) Other Humanities
(P) Engineering & Materials Science
(P) Math & Computer Science
(C) P&HPS
(C) Physics
(C) Medical
(C) Biology
(C) Chemistry
(C) Psychology
(C) Environment
(C) Social Sciences
(C) Other Humanities
(C) Engineering & Materials Science
(C) Math & Computer Science
Record Set 1
Articles Published by
Philosophers of Science
Record Set 2
Articles Citing Articles by 
Philosophers of Science
Fig. 1 Alluvial diagram of knowledge diffusion from articles published by philosophers of science to
articles in 11 disciplinary clusters
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Models
ERGMs are one of the most important and widely-used classes of statistical models for
networks. Broadly speaking, ERGMs have been developed with the goal of drawing
inferences about the formation of network structures. One of the core theoretical ideas
behind this class of models is that macro-level network structures emerge from small
micro-level network patterns called ‘‘configurations’’ (e.g., edges, two-stars, triangles)
(Lusher et al. 2012; Prell 2012; Robins 2011, 2015; Robins et al. 2007). ERGMs estimate
the presence or absence of ties as a function of both lower-level endogenous network
processes (e.g., transitivity, reciprocity, homophily) and exogenous factors such as attri-
butes of nodes (Lusher et al. 2012; Prell 2012; Robins 2011, 2015; Robins et al. 2007).
For readers unfamiliar with ERGMs, it can be helpful to think of them as similar in
respects to logistic regression, but with specific differences that are necessary for modeling
networks statistically.7 Like a logistic regression, ERMGs estimate a binary outcome
(whether or not a tie forms between two nodes) as a function of covariates. However,
unlike logistic regression, which assumes independent observations, ERGMs are designed
to handle the many dependencies inherent in networks by using computationally-intensive
simulation techniques that are conditioned on the structure of the observed network. Unlike
logistic regression, then, ERGMs can include covariates that capture endogenous network
processes. For example, we can estimate the effect of transitivity, net of other covariates,
on the likelihood of tie formation.
In this application, ERGMs model the likelihood of receiving a citation (i.e., a directed
edge in a citation network) as a function of endogenous processes such as specialization
and exogenous factors such as characteristics of the author and the journal a paper is
published in. We developed two ERGMs (using the Statnet package for R, Handcock et al.
2008) to estimate the likelihood of a philosopher of science receiving a citation within the
philosophy of science citation network. The first is a baseline model, and includes the
endogenous covariates that we consider most relevant for capturing the dynamics of a
citation network. The second is our full model, which includes a variety of exogenous
variables such as the disciplinary classifications of the journals that philosophy of science
articles are published in, the number of authors on a paper, the number of papers that the
author or co-authors published in top-ranked philosophy of science journals, and the
number of citations the article received in each of the 11 disciplinary clusters. A full list of
the relevant variables is provided below.
Endogenous terms in the baseline and full models
We included endogenous terms for edges, popularity spread (geometrically weighted
indegree), activity spread (outdegree), clustering (geometrically weighted edgewise shared
partners), and two-paths (geometrically weighted dyadwise shared partners). The edges
term estimates the probability of an edge existing between two nodes based on the number
of edges that exist in the original network. It is analogous to an intercept in a regression
model and is rarely interpreted. The geometrically weighted terms assume that the
7 Readers familiar with generalized linear models but unfamiliar with exponential random graph models
may wish to consult the detailed comparison in Lusher et al. (2012).
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likelihood of additional structures existing reduces as the number increases. We describe
each geometrically weighted term below.
The popularity spread term (gwidegree) allows us to control for the distribution of
received citations. The term is geometrically weighted, meaning it assumes that each
additional citation is less likely than the previous one. This is important because most
philosophy of science articles are not highly cited. In other words, the probability of
receiving 4 citations is higher than the probability of receiving 5 citations.8 A negative
effect would indicate that philosophy articles tend to receive similar levels of citations as
the other philosophy articles that cite them. For example, highly cited articles are cited by
other highly cited articles, and articles with few citations are cited by articles that also have
few citations. Similarly, we control for the size of bibliographies using an activity spread
term (gwodegree). The negative effect observed in the model indicates that articles tend to
cite a similar number of papers as the articles they cite and the articles that cite them.
While not substantively interesting, this term is an essential control variable.
We control for clustering in the network by using a geometrically weighted edgewise
shared partner (gwesp). This term accounts for the distribution of structural triangles in the
network, assuming that closing an additional triangle is less likely the more closed tri-
angles a node is already part of. In other words, the probability of an added citation that
will make an article part of a fifth triangle is less than the probability of the citation that
makes it part of a fourth triangle. This term was developed by the statnet (Handcock et al.
2008) team because of the computational challenges in controlling directly for transitivity
in a large network. A positive effect for gwesp suggests a higher number of closed triangles
in the network, and hence greater clustering.
Finally, our last endogenous variable controls for two-paths using a geometrically
weighted dyadwise shared partner (gwdsp) term. It assumes that an edge creating a two-
path is less likely the more two-paths it would create. In other words, the probability that an
added citation will create four two-paths is higher than the probability of creating five two-
paths. A negative effect in conjunction with a positive clustering effect would indicate that
two-paths tend to be closed; they appear less often than would be expected, except as part
of triangles.
Exogenous terms in the full model
In addition to these endogenous terms, our full model includes exogenous variables to
estimate the effects of (1) whether or not an article was published in a top-ranked journal,
(2) whether or not an article was published in a journal outside of philosophy of science,
(3) the number of authors on an article, (4) the total number of articles the authors
previously published in the top-ranked philosophy of science journals, (5) the amount of
time between publication and citation, (6) citation temporal direction (explained below),
and (7) the number of citations from each of the 11 disciplinary clusters. Each of these
variables is described below.
First, we have some basic controls for the types of journal in which an article is
published. As Fig. 1 makes clear, philosophers of science publish in many journals that are
8 Initially, this seems to contradict the well-established Matthew effect (Merton 1973)—cumulative
advantage—in academic citations. However, the gwidegree term improves the goodness of fit of the model.
We suspect that this is because, for most philosophy articles, the probability of being highly cited is fairly
low. In other words, gwidegree helps us control for the fact the most philosophy of science articles are not
highly cited. Of course, bigger fields with higher publication and citation rates may differ.
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outside of specialized philosophy journals. These journals all come from fields with dif-
ferent types of publication and citation practices. Despite these differences, we know that
there are journal hierarchies in all disciplines that publish articles, and that publishing in an
elite journal is different than publishing in a non-elite journal, regardless of the discipline.
We control for this difference while respecting disciplinary differences in citation practices
by ranking journals by their impact factors within their disciplinary contexts for each
publication year. If a journal impact factor is within the top 10% in its disciplinary context
in the publication year, we code it as a top-ranked journal. A positive effect for this term
would indicate that an article published in a top-ranked journal is more likely to receive
citations from other philosophers of science than would be expected by random chance. In
addition, we added a published outside discipline term to account for the effect of pub-
lishing in journals outside of philosophy of science. A negative effect would indicate that
articles published in non-philosophy of science journals are less likely to be cited by
philosophers of science.
We also included two terms to control for the number of authors on a paper and the
extent to which those authors published in the core philosophy of science journals leading
up to the article in question. The first term is straightforward. A positive effect for number
of authors would indicate that having more co-authors increases the likelihood of being
cited by other philosophers of science. Philosophy of science is primarily a single-author
field. Thus, having higher numbers of co-authors is an indicator of articles that are less
conventional in the field. We constructed the second term—number of articles previously
published in the seven core PoS journals—by searching the philosophy record set for other
papers (co-)authored by the authors of any given paper. For every paper that an author
previously published in one of the seven core philosophy of science journals,9 we add a
score of 1. A positive effect would indicate that previous publications in core journals
improve the likelihood that future publications will receive citations from other philoso-
phers of science.
Finally, we have two terms that control for the temporal aspects of citations. First,
citation temporal direction controls for the ‘‘tendency’’ for articles to cite articles that were
published before them. Early formulations of the model suffered from unaccept-
able goodness of fit for mean geodesic distance because they did not have a way of
handling the inability of papers to cite other papers that had not yet been written. With the
rare exception of citing as-of-yet unpublished manuscripts a year or two in advance, it is
impossible for authors to cite papers that don’t yet exist. This problem can be ameliorated
with a term that distinguishes between directional edges from later papers to earlier papers
(likely) and from earlier papers to later papers (highly unlikely). No suitable constraint or
term was found in any of the ERGM packages available as of this paper’s publication date;
as such, we used the ergm.userterms package (Hunter et al. 2013) to construct our own
term that controls for the tendency of papers to cite older papers. A positive effect indicates
that papers are more likely to cite papers older than themselves. This term proved essential
to improving the goodness of fit to the point where the observed network and the simulated
networks were in near-perfect agreement.
The second temporal term, absolute age difference, captures the amount of time
between the publication of an article and its citations. A positive effect would indicate that
9 The top-ranked journal variable indicates whether or not the article was published in a journal whose
impact factor is within the top 10% within its disciplinary context. The seven core philosophy of science
journals are not identified based on their impact factors. Instead, they are the journals that philosophers of
science have indicated are the major specialized journals within their field.
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papers are more likely to receive citations from papers that are published shortly thereafter,
and less likely to receive citations from papers published far in the future.
The disciplinary terms in the model enable us to assess the relationships between
citations from philosophers of science and citations from each of the 11 disciplinary
clusters. A positive effect for any of these 11 variables would indicate that, net of other
factors, citations from non-philosophers of science increase the likelihood of also receiving
citations from other philosophers of science, and would therefore support the cumulative
advantage hypothesis. A negative effect would suggest that receiving citations from out-
side philosophy of science reduces the likelihood of being cited by other philosophers, and
would therefore support the citation penalty hypothesis. Minimal or negligible effects
would support the indifference hypothesis, as increased citations from outside philosophy
of science neither increase or decrease the likelihood of being cited by philosophers.
Support for the field-specific hypothesis would show up as a mix of positive, negative, or
no effect across disciplinary clusters.
Results
Our baseline model includes the endogenous properties we considered most important to a
disciplinary citation network, including the number of citations in the network (edges), the
distributions of giving and receiving citations (popularity spread and activity spread), and
the propensity for clustering and two-paths.10 The results of the baseline model 1 are
presented in Table 1.
Our baseline model does a reasonably good job of capturing the dynamics of citations in
philosophy of science despite including only endogenous covariates. All were statistically
significant. The popularity spread term’s negative coefficient suggests that articles tend to
have a similar number of citations as the articles they cite. The strongly positive clustering
term indicates a high number of transitive triads, and the much smaller negative two-path
term suggests a weak but significant tendency away from unclosed triads. Together, these
two effects suggest that philosophy papers often cite papers in a relevant area of discussion,
and they tend not to cite papers that do not cite other relevant papers. In other words,
philosophers tend to cite papers within the pool of papers relevant to their topic; our
baseline model is primarily capturing specialization within philosophy of science.11 This is
exactly what a good baseline model of a citation network should capture.
We created goodness of fit diagnostic plots—shown in Fig. 2—for the baseline model.
The basic idea in assessing goodness of fit in ERGMs is whether or not simulations
conditional on the observed network captures structural features (e.g., minimum geodesic
distance) that were not actually modeled (Hunter et al. 2008; Koskinen and Snidjers
10 By including these terms, we ensure that significant two-path and clustering effects are separate from the
functional dependencies that arise from edges, popularity spread, and activity spread.
11 Of course, we do not mean to suggest that this is the only reason for citation clustering. There are
complex reasons for why authors cite some authors and not others. However, when looking at patterns
within and across intellectual fields, decisions about which author or paper to cite are most likely to come
into play within some smaller subset of authors and articles, not the entire field. For example, if I am
networks researcher making a decision about who to cite for an overview of statistical approaches to
network analysis, I am more likely to cite someone who is actually doing work on statistical models for
networks than someone working in another area of network science. Within the subset of authors working on
statistical network models, I may make citation decisions in ways that favour people I know, or who have
cited me, etc. Given the type of models and analysis in this paper, we think it is reasonable to assume that
the citation clustering we see if primarily driven by specialization, even if individual citation decisions
between one author or another are shaped by other considerations.
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2013).12 The plots show how well the observed network is described by purely endogenous
effects. The simulated networks were suitably well matched to the observed distributions
across indegree, outdegree, edgewise shared partners. The model slightly underestimated
indegree and outdegree distributions for values of 1 and 2, and slightly overestimated for
values from 4 to 9. This suggests that our model had some issue capturing the behavior of
these distributions at those values. This might indicate that an unmeasured variable has a
particularly strong effect on papers with indegrees and outdegrees at these values, or that
there may be a shift in behavior at these values that the geometrically-weighted terms
cannot perfectly capture. The model overestimated the proportion of edges that were not
part of a transitive triad and slightly underestimated the proportions in 1 or 2 transitive
triads. All other values and terms were within the estimated margins of error for the
Table 1 ERGM results
Likelihood of PoS citation
(1) (2)
Edges 7.177*** - 17.535***
Popularity spread - 3.406*** - 2.507***
Activity spread - 2.522*** - 1.658***
Clustering (a = .7) 3.983*** 5.236***
Two-paths (a=.7) - 0.169*** - 0.141***
Top-ranked journal 0.072
Journal outside PoS - 0.187***
Number of authors 0.001
No. of articles previously published in the seven core PoS journals 0.016***
Citation temporal direction 10.946***
Absolute age difference - 0.065***
Citations from disciplinary clusters:
Biology 0.0002
Chemistry - 0.005***
Engineering and materials science 0.001
Environment 0.003***
Humanities 0.054***
Math and computer science 0.007***
Medical science 0.002***
Physics - 0.001***
Professional fields - 0.001
Psychology - 0.001***
Social science 0.0003
AIC 842,182.700 743,550.900
BIC 842,273.900 743,952.300
*p\ .05;**p\ .01;***p\ .001
12 For readers unfamiliar with ERGMs, in the two goodness of fit plots in this paper, goodness of fit should
considered good if the thick black lines (observed statistics) are aligned with the simulations (the boxplots).
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observed network. As previously noted, the goodness of fit is not acceptable for minimum
geodesic distance. We resolved this issue by including the citation temporal direction term
in the full model.
Our full model kept the terms used in the baseline model and included new exogenous
terms controlling for temporal direction of citations, difference in ages between citing and
cited papers, whether or not an article was published in a top-ranked philosophy of science
journal, whether or not an article was published in a journal outside of philosophy of
science, the number of authors, total number of articles the authors previously published in
the seven core philosophy of science journals. We also included exogenous terms for
citation counts in each of the 11 disciplinary cultures. The results are reported in Table 1.
All of our endogenous effects remained statistically significant. Their estimated coef-
ficients remained similar, with the exception of the clustering term, which became slightly
stronger. This means that, after controlling for exogenous effects, we see an even stronger
tendency towards closing transitive citation triads. Again, this almost certainly reflects
specialization in the philosophy of science citation network. The exogenous control
variables show that being an older paper (i.e., having longer to accumulate citations), being
published in a top philosophy of science journal,13 having a history of publishing other
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Fig. 2 Goodness-of-fit diagnostic plots for the base model with endogenous terms only. The thick black
lines represent observed network statistics. Boxplots represent distributions from the simulated networks
13 The positive effect for this term may be due to several non-exclusive mechanisms. Papers in major
journals may be more visible, thus receiving greater attention. Authors may choose to cite papers from major
journals on the premise that they provide stronger evidence than papers from less prestigious journals. The
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papers in core philosophy of science journals, and having co-authors all have positive
effects on receiving a citation. The negative coefficient for the absolute difference in age
between citing and cited papers indicates that papers tend to cite papers that are similar in
age. In other words, authors tend to cite newer work more frequently than a large body of
classics.
Publishing in a non-philosophy of science journal has a negative and significant effect
on receiving citations from philosophers of science. One simple reason for this effect could
be that papers in non-philosophy of science journals are less visible to philosophers of
science or are less relevant to disciplinary discussions, and thus are cited less. Other
possibilities include that traditional philosophers of science view publishing in science
journals as not maintaining a critical distance from the scientific communities or not
meeting high philosophical standards. Of course, our model cannot differentiate between
these mechanisms nor determine if all are at work.
The terms for citations in each of the 11 disciplinary clusters enable us to evaluate our
hypotheses about the relationship between philosophy of science and the sciences. We
found positive effects for receiving citations from environment, humanities, math and
computer science, and medical papers. Conversely, we found negative effects for receiving
citations from chemistry, physics, and psychology papers. None of the other terms indi-
cated significant effects. While the observed mix of positive and negative effects across the
disciplines could be interpreted as support for the field-specific hypothesis, most effects are
extremely small. Depending on the case, we would be looking at hundreds of citations
from scientists costing a single citation from a philosopher. Presumably few philosophers
would trade 100 citations from non-philosophers for a single citation from another
philosopher. Therefore, we consider this to be better evidence for the indifference
hypothesis. Receiving citations from any of these 11 disciplinary clusters does not result in
any meaningful citation boosts or penalties.
We compared the goodness of fit for our full model, shown in Fig. 3, against the
goodness of fit for the baseline model, shown in Fig. 2. The model’s estimation of the
original network’s distribution has minor improvements for in-degree, out-degree, and
edge-wise shared partners, and major improvements for minimum geodesic distance. Both
the base and full models are able to accurately reproduce global features of the observed
network, but the full model is a considerably better fit.
Discussion and conclusion
As stated at the beginning of this paper, we consider highly general statements about the
siloed or webbed nature of disciplinary communication and boundaries to be counter-
productive. Instead, the goal of this work is to contribute to a line of research that focuses
on the nature of specific disciplinary boundaries, and on the relationship between disci-
plinary boundaries and citation dynamics. To that end, our goal in this paper was to
develop statistical network models to test hypotheses about how publishing in and being
cited by articles published in science journals impact philosophers’ positions within their
disciplinary citation network.
We found that philosophers of science publish regularly outside of their discipline, and
that much of this philosophical work gets cited by articles in science journals. However,
Footnote 13 continued
major journals may get the highest quality submissions from the field, allowing them to pick the best, which
are then subsequently recognized by other philosophers in the form of citations.
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these interdisciplinary exchanges do not result in philosophers gaining or losing influence
within their disciplinary context. These findings are broadly supportive of the ‘‘indifference
hypothesis:’’ net of other factors, philosophers’ successes outside of their own disciplinary
context are largely irrelevant to their standing within philosophy of science.
Somewhat paradoxically, these findings can be interpreted as broadly consistent with
both general perspectives on knowledge diffusion and disciplinary boundaries introduced
at this start of this article. As we have shown, an enormous amount of the work done by
philosophers of science is published in journals from other disciplines, and this work is
cited outside of philosophy of science. Even more telling, roughly half of the citations to
articles published in philosophy of science and history and philosophy of science journals
come from articles published outside the discipline (see the bottom left side of Fig. 1). This
seems to us to be perfectly consistent with other bibliometric challenges to the ‘‘disciplines
are silos’’ argument.
Despite this seemingly clear evidence against the siloed disciplines argument,
philosophers of science simultaneously display insularity. Collectively, they appear
indifferent to philosophical work that appears in journals outside of their own field, and
philosophers of science who are cited by non-philosophers do not see a corresponding
increase in their citations from philosophers. It seems that, collectively, philosophers of
science are largely unaware of and indifferent towards the publication of and citation of
philosophical work in non-philosophy journals. This evidence of insularity is aligned with
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Fig. 3 Goodness-of-fit diagnostic plots for the full model with endogenous and exogenous terms. The thick
black lines represent observed network statistics. Boxplots represent distributions from the simulated
networks
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the general criticism of disciplines as inward-looking silos. In this sense, it makes sense to
think of philosophy of science and the sciences as separate worlds, and philosophers often
export their work to the non-philosophy worlds, but what happens in the non-philosophy
worlds doesn’t have an impact on what happens in philosophy of science.
This is yet another reason why we think that empirical work on the boundaries between
and intellectual reputations within specific disciplines is more useful than high-level
arguments about the state of knowledge diffusion and communication across all disci-
plinary boundaries. The simultaneous evidence of interdisciplinarity and insularity in
philosophy of science is, in our view, consistent with the argument from scientific trading
theory that some disciplines are more self-contained than others while still being embedded
in a massive intellectual network of linked disciplines (Boyack et al. 2005; Bo¨rner et al.
2003; Bo¨rner et al. 2012; Chen and Hicks 2004; Leydesdorff and Rafols 2009; Moody and
Light 2006; Skupin et al. 2013). If philosophers of science were genuinely at odds with the
sciences they study, we would see evidence of a citation penalty for philosophical work
that is published in, or receives a lot of attention from, scientists. If, on the other hand, they
perceive only weak and relatively unimportant disciplinary boundaries between their work
and that of the sciences, then we would expect to see evidence of a citation boost.
However, our results suggest that philosophy of science is a field in which philosophers are
neither rewarded nor penalized for engaging with and being recognized by other fields. It is
simultaneously open (interdisciplinary without penalty) and closed (interdisciplinary
without reward).
Of course, this simultaneous interdisciplinarity and insularity—philosophers neither
gain nor lose when their work is exported to the sciences they study—does not mean that
there are no costs for those who want to do work that is engaged with scientists. Doing
scientifically engaged work is easier for philosophers who work in departments that
explicitly value interdisciplinary scholarship. Our work is consistent with the idea that
philosophers who do not work in such departments and who do want to do scientifically
engaged work must have dual philosophical and scientific careers, which is certainly a high
price to pay. However, this aspect of the problem is institutional and cannot be adequately
addressed with models of citation dynamics. Instead, we address it in separate papers that
analyze data from surveys and semi-structured interviews with philosophers of science.
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